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The government in British-ruled India established cooperative banks to compete with private 
moneylenders in the rural credit market. State officials expected greater competition to increase 
the supply of low-cost credit, thereby expanding investment potential for the rural poor. 
Cooperatives did increase credit supply but captured a small share of the credit market and 
reported net losses throughout the late colonial and early post-colonial period. The paper asks 
why this experiment did not succeed and offers two explanations. First, low savings restricted 
the role of social capital and mutual supervision as methods of financial regulation in the 
cooperative sector. Second, a political-economic ideology that privileged equity over 
efficiency made for weak administrative regulation. 
 














Agriculture was the largest yet least productive sector of the Indian economy during the 
colonial period.1 Underdeveloped financial markets, it is widely believed, are one root of the 
problem.2 Private moneylenders controlled the supply of credit to rich and poor peasants in 
rural India. The colonial government believed that investment rates were low and the price of 
credit was high because markets were supply-constrained and non-competitive. Policy 
initiatives in the early twentieth century established competing sources of credit to rival private 
creditors. Officials in the colonial government expected greater market competition to increase 
the supply of low-cost rural credit. However, the high risk of lending in the Indian countryside 
was a barrier to entry for commercial banks. Cultivation was seasonal and dependent on 
unpredictable rainfall patterns. Crop failure was common, leading to high default rates.3 
Inefficient courts as well as limited use of bills and negotiated instruments restrained 
institutional development in the market for agricultural credit.4  
Cooperative banking offered a potential solution to the problem.5 Contemporary studies on 
Raiffeisen cooperatives in Western Europe referred to these as models to follow.6 Present-day 
scholarship endorses that view. Cooperatives in Germany and the Netherlands provided credit 
to the poor and reported profits in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.7 Scholars explain 
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their success by highlighting two key pre-conditions for successful cooperative banking.8 First, 
cooperatives were self-funded within small membership groups. Rich and poor peasants saved 
in local cooperatives, while a high ratio of savings to external borrowing ensured banks were 
not over-leveraged. Second, governments in Western Europe implemented regulatory and 
supervision structures that ensured cooperatives were well managed. In the context of high 
savings and strong regulation, members absorbed the risk of lending which not only allowed 
German and Dutch cooperatives to form a source of low-cost credit for peasants but also 
guaranteed their profitability and resilience to crisis.9  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Early to mid-twentieth century India presents a useful case study of cooperatives. 
Cooperatives were a state-driven initiative in India and the colonial government set up the first 
Indian cooperative in the Madras province in 1904.10 The success of rural cooperatives in 
Europe inspired this initiative. According to an Indian economist in the 1930s, ‘the study of 
the small village banks in Germany towards the close of the last century attracted the attention 
of those who were eager to solve the problem of rural poverty.’11 Policymakers in colonial and 
post-colonial India continued to invest their confidence in the cooperative movement as a 
solution to the credit problem. They believed that, ‘great things were expected of the 
cooperative movement in India, on the analogy of its phenomenal success in Europe.’12  
The paper shows that the transplanted cooperative banking model did not perform well in 
India. The cooperative sector grew exponentially in the early to mid-twentieth century. The 
size of the cooperative sector in 1950s Madras mirrored that of Germany at the turn of the 
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century.13 However, cooperatives failed to displace the village moneylender. Managers of 
cooperatives selectively allocated loans and despite this selective allocation, the cooperative 
sector was unprofitable.  
 Why did the experiment fail to achieve its main aims? The paper answers that 
administrators in late-colonial and early post-colonial India designed a cooperative model that 
differed from the European model in important ways. Prevailing political objectives prioritising 
equity over efficiency led to a cooperative structure operating with low savings and weak 
regulation. The regulatory problem ultimately led to exclusion of poorer peasants from 
accessing credit and over-leveraged cooperative banks. 
What was the problem with regulation? The stylized model of Raiffeisen banking in Europe 
suggests that cooperatives could succeed because savings rates were high. In Madras, however, 
poor peasants did not raise enough capital while rich peasants refused to save in village 
cooperatives. Depositors were few and members cum borrowers were plenty, restricting the 
role of social capital and self-supervision as regulatory mechanisms. Contrary to the European 
model where poorly resourced banks could succeed if they were well regulated, cooperatives 
in rural Madras were regulated by administrative bodies which did not enforce competent 
banking regulation. The Indian government created the first Banking Regulation Act in 1949 
and it did not cover cooperatives. Specific laws passed by the governments in the provinces 
regulated cooperatives in the colonial and early post-colonial period. Political and 
organizational interest overlapped, leading to the mismanagement of cooperative banks. Post-
colonial Indian governments injected public money into the cooperative sector in the belief that 
this would increase credit access for poor borrowers. However, flaws in regulatory design 
persisted, allowing managers to falsify accounts, embezzle and insider-lend.  
The paper’s contribution is threefold. First, it contributes to a regionally under-researched 
topic. Kamenov, in a recent article on cooperatives in India, observed that ‘what seems prima 
facie striking for a historical issue of such significance is the sparse attention the theme has 
generated over the last couple of decades.’14 The existing literature provides a discussion on 
socio-political barriers to cooperation.15 Instead, the paper considers the design of the 
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transplanted cooperative banking model as an explanation for its non-performance. Second, the 
paper adds a region of comparison to the global business and economic history of credit 
cooperatives. The existing scholarship is largely Eurocentric, despite the emergence, and rapid 
rise in the number, of cooperative banks in British colonies in the early twentieth century.16 
Analysing the performance of cooperatives in India offers a benchmark for further 
contributions on similar transplants in other colonial contexts. Third, the paper uses a 
previously unexplored group of primary sources that report on the cooperative sector in rural 
Madras from 1930 to 1960. As cooperatives were a state-driven initiative, officials in the Indian 
provinces regularly recorded key performance measures of the cooperative sector. The paper 
combines data from these government reports with new case judgements from provincial 
courts. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first provides background on agriculture in 
Madras, the political motivations for introducing cooperatives and a summary of key features 
of the cooperative model in the province. The second traces the expansion of the cooperative 
sector and its lack of profitability in the early to mid-twentieth century. The third demonstrates 
that cooperatives were mismanaged because of low savings and weak regulation. The fourth 
shows that state financing in the 1940s sustained failing cooperatives but prolonged flaws in 
the sector’s regulatory structure.  
 
2 Agriculture, Credit and the Cooperative Model  
 
The majority of India’s population lived in rural areas and were employed in agriculture 
during the colonial and early post-colonial period. Markets developed and expanded in the 
nineteenth century, aided by a growth in road and railway construction.17 However, by all 
measures, agriculture performed poorly in Madras and across most of British-ruled India until 
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roughly 1960. GDP and productivity in agriculture grew modestly throughout colonial rule.18 
In the same period, population grew rapidly and the share of the labor force in agriculture 
remained stagnant.19 Low investment constrained innovation as production processes remained 
trapped in a low-yielding regime.20 Rural Madras, as with the rest of colonial India, contended 
with poor quality soil, limited irrigation and unpredictable rainfall patterns. High demand and 
volatile supply led to frequent food shortages, with some years of mass famine. Cheaper credit, 
for consumption and production, could potentially redress subsistence crises and improve 
investment rates. But credit was expensive in rural India. 
Private, informal credit was an important input in rural India during the colonial period. 
Rich and poor peasants had little access to formal banking in the countryside and relied on 
moneylenders for credit. The credit market in Madras presented distinct features, relative to 
markets in other provinces. Whereas traders and financiers from the cities extended credit in 
the agricultural sector in Bombay and Punjab, cultivators were the sole suppliers of credit in 
rural Madras.21 A government report in 1930 noted that moneylending in villages was, ‘from 
one ryot (cultivator) to another while the rural moneylender who does nothing but lend is 
rare.’22 Several moneylenders operated within villages. Large landowners did lend money, as 
did smaller landowners and tenant cultivators with disposable income.23 Moneylenders were 
numerous but the cost of credit was high in Madras. Moneylenders charged monthly rather than 
annual interest rates. A survey of the Bellary district in colonial Madras noted that rates varied 
‘from 1 to 2.5 per cent per mensem.’24 Compounded annually, moneylenders commonly 
charged an interest rate of between 12 and 24 per cent per annum in the early to mid-twentieth 
century.25 
 
18 Alan Heston, "National Income,"in The Cambridge Economic History of India, edited by Dharma Kumar and 
Meghnad Desai, (Cambridge, 1983); S. Sivasubramoniam, National Income of India in the Twentieth Century, 
(Oxford, 2000). 
19 Christopher Baker, "Colonial Rule and the Internal Economy in Twentieth-century Madras." Modern Asian 
Studies 15, no. 3 (1981); David A. Washbrook, Colonialism, Globalization and the Economy of South-East India, 
C.1700-1900. Working Papers of the Global Economic History Network (GEHN); No. 24/06. (2005). 
20 Christopher Baker, An Indian Rural Economy 1880-1955: The Tamilnad Countryside. (Oxford, 1984), 136, 
approaches rural development in Madras as a conflict between rising demand and the scarcity of ‘productive 
resources.’ 
21 Official reports in colonial India distinguish the moneylenders by ‘professional’ and ‘agriculturist’. The reports 
suggest that financiers from the Gujarati and Marwari communities were professional moneylenders and supplied 
credit in rural Bombay and Punjab. In contrast, cultivators with disposable income were agriculturist 
moneylenders and supplied credit to other cultivators in Madras. See Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 43. 
22 Madras Provincial Banking Enquiry Report Vol I, (Madras, 1930), 220. 
23 District surveyors in the 1930s documented the number of moneylenders in select villages. Provincial Banking 
Enquiry Report, 220, commented that ‘there are moneylenders everywhere.’ The Report on Agricultural 
Indebtedness, found that 24 moneylenders operated in one village in the East Godavari district. 
24 Madras District Gazetteers: Bellary Vol. I, (Madras, 1915), 101. 
25 Provincial Banking Enquiry Report, 221. 
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Officers in the colonial government claimed that exploitation in rural credit markets 
depressed growth and widened inequality in rural India. Average landholdings were small. The 
average landholding in late 1920s India was approximately 6 acres, one-tenth the size of the 
average holding in Britain and just over one-fifth the size of the average holding in the 
Netherlands.26 Government surveyors typically classified small landholders as those owning 
less than five acres of land and large landholders as those owning above 25 acres. Historians 
show that land ownership was either fragmented into multiple smallholdings or concentrated 
at the top end and of the ownership structure, leaving a fractional sub-section in the middle.27 
The colonial government acknowledged this but believed that the problem persisted through 
elite capture in rural credit markets. In the government’s interpretation, poor borrowers 
defaulted on expensive loans to wealthy landowners, leading to transfers of land from peasants 
to richer cultivators.28 Accordingly, officials targeted diminishing exploitation in rural credit 
as a broader strategy to address rising inequality.29  
Government intervention took two forms. First, provincial legislators regulated 
moneylenders through usury laws.30 Second, colonial officials acted on a belief that 
competition from regulated cooperatives in villages would disrupt the market power of private 
lenders. Indeed, cooperatives became the focal point of the government’s rural development 
strategy in the early twentieth century. 
The colonial government conducted research on successful cooperative banking 
experiments in Europe prior to transplanting the model in India. In an 1895 government report 
on ‘the possibility of introducing land and agricultural banks into the Madras Presidency’, 
Frederick Nicholson surveyed credit cooperatives in Europe and suggested the conditions 
required for the transplant of a similar banking experiment in India.31 Nicholson asserted 
 
26 C. F. Strickland, "Coöperation and the Rural Problem of India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 
(1929), 504. 
27 David Washbrook, "Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930." Modern Asian Studies 7, no. 3 (1973): 476-480; 
Dharma Kumar, “Landownership and Inequality in Madras Presidency: 1853-54 to 1946-47”, The Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 12, no. 3(1975): 229-261. 
28 S. S. Thorburn, a civil servant in the Punjab province, believed that rich landowners held poor peasants in 
persistent debt bondage during the late nineteenth century. See Septimus Smet Thorburn, Musalmans and Money-
lenders in the Punjab, (London, 1886).  
29 The colonial government believed that inequality motivated conflict in the countryside. Officials in the Bombay 
Presidency saw the 1870s Deccan Riots as a conflict between poor peasants and rich moneylenders. See Catanach, 
Rural Credit in Western India. 
30 The government in Madras enforced an interest rate ceiling on loans from moneylenders in the mid-1930s. 
31 Frederick Augustus Nicholson joined the Indian Civil Service in 1869. Nicholson was stationed in the Madras 
Presidency and was promoted from the lower ranks of district administrator to member of the Legislative Council 




support for rural cooperatives and concluded the report with the phrase ‘Find Raiffeisen.’32 
Nicholson identified three essential principles of Raiffeisen cooperation in Europe. First, the 
membership of each cooperative bank remained small and localised. Second, cooperative banks 
were self-funded through members’ savings. Third, cooperative banks determined the 
creditworthiness of borrowers by ‘personal character’ rather than land or physical collateral.33  
Nicholson’s report convinced the government of the benefits of cooperative banking. The 
provincial government in Madras established rural cooperatives in 1904, the same year that 
Nicholson retired from government service. As such, Nicholson did not participate in the 
implementation of the cooperative transplant. The government, with limited input from 
Nicholson, enforced laws in the early twentieth century that determined the capital and 
regulatory structure of the cooperative movement.34 Did the implemented model facilitate rural 
cooperation?  
If the aim was to expand the supply of credit in villages, that aim was initially met to a small 
extent. Cooperatives accepted deposits from members and non-members, hoping these deposits 
would finance the expansion in credit supply.35 By 1905, it became clear to policymakers that 
cooperatives struggled to raise savings from villages alone.36 The government, still focused on 
expanding credit supply, created a three-tier banking structure to compensate for the low level 
of savings in villages. The provincial government established the Madras Central Urban Bank 
(MCUB) which accepted deposits from members and non-members in metropolitan Madras. 
The MCUB provided credit to primary banks.37 The number of primary banks increased in the 
early twentieth century, exceeding the financial scope of the MCUB. The government created 
district banks to provide loans to primary banks in 1909. District banks were funded by three 
groups. First, members and non-members saved and owned shares in district banks. Second, 
primary banks deposited reserves into district banks. Third municipal and district level 
government departments saved public money in district banks. District banks did not lend to 
individual borrowers but exclusively to primary banks. By 1930, the cooperative three-tier 
structure included primary banks as creditors to cultivators in villages, apex district banks and 
an apex provincial bank as feeders to primary banks. In developing this cooperative model, the 
 
32 Report Regarding the Possibility of Introducing Land and Agricultural Banks into the Madras Presidency, 
(Madras, 1897), 185. 
33 Report Regarding the Possibility. 
34 The 1904 and 1912 Cooperative Societies Acts provided guidelines within which cooperative banks operated. 
35 The law stipulated that cooperatives could only lend to members. 
36 The Madras Co-operative Manual, (Madras, 1921), 7.  
37 The MCUB later changed its name to the Madras Provincial Cooperative Bank. 
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government succeeded in expanding the supply of credit, but made internal supervision 
challenging, as a later section will show. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The government supplemented the expansion in credit supply with rules that stipulated the 
participation of poor peasants in the management of primary banks. The government needed 
rich peasants to participate in order to keep savings high and cooperatives self-funded. Yet, it 
also needed to ensure that banks were not hijacked by richer cultivators that wielded greater 
social and political power in the countryside. As prescribed by the provincial government in 
Madras, a panchayat or governing board of five managers, including one President and one 
Secretary, managed each primary bank.38 Members of each primary bank elected its 
panchayat.39 Once elected, managers were either honorary or professionally employed and paid 
an annual remuneration by the bank.40 The colonial government established Supervising 
Unions in 1910 to ensure transparency in the management of primary banks.41 Supervising 
Unions performed two tasks. First, Unions reviewed the lending operations of primary banks 
and reported on the profile of borrowers. Second, Unions judged applications made by primary 
banks for loans from district banks.42 Unions submitted annual reports of primary banks to their 
district bank creditors. In theory, reports from Supervising Unions identified management 
problems, including banks where rich managers discriminated against poor peasants.  
The caste system was one potential barrier to cooperation in the Indian countryside. The 
government considered the diversity of membership a vital determinant of the success of the 
cooperative movement. Official reports classified members of primary banks by religion and 
caste. Surveyors recorded six categories including, ‘Non-Brahmans, Brahmans, Adi-Dravidas, 
 
38 The Cooperatives Societies Acts in 1904 and 1912 did not specify management structure. In 1914, a federal 
committee under the leadership of Edward Douglas MacLagan, a provincial legislator in Punjab, reported on the 
ideal management structure of primary banks. Five years later, the federal government delegated the power to 
legislate in the cooperative sector to governments in the individual provinces. Following guidance in the 
MacLagan Committee’s report, the provincial government in early 1920s Madras formally established election 
rules as well as the roles and responsibilities of the elected managers. 
39 In the late-colonial period, primary banks held annual general meetings where members elected managers. Laws 
in the post-colonial period stipulated elections every three years. 
40 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, (Bombay, 1960), 441. 
41 The provincial government grouped primary banks, that were in close proximity to each other, in Unions. The 
aim was for managers from one primary bank to supervise and advise managers from another. The government 
implemented this policy to avoid the additional expenses of appointing external supervisors (Cooperative Manual, 
36). Unions did not audit primary banks. The government undertook this responsibility in the 1920s, as discussed 
in a later section. 
42 Annual Report on the Working of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act 1929 (Madras, 1928-1939), 25-26. 
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Christians, Muhammadans and other classes.’ Reports that classified members by groups of 
‘Brahman’ and ‘Non-Brahman’ attempted to create a clear distinction between socio-economic 
classes. Government officials considered Brahmans as richer landowners and lower castes as 
smallholders and tenants. According to one provincial report in 1929, 12 per cent of members 
were Brahmans, 63 per cent were ‘Non-Brahman’ and 25 per cent were from other religions 
and castes.43 The provincial government celebrated this outcome. From these numbers, there 
was diversity in the voting membership group of each primary bank. However, contrary to the 
government’s view, the presence of diversity alone was not enough to suggest cooperation. 
External supervision was needed to ensure one group did not discriminate against another. As 
subsequent sections will show, the Supervising Unions did not perform this role successfully. 
We now turn to how the cooperative model performed. 
  
3 Performance Puzzle: Expansion but Unprofitable   
 
By all measures, the size of the cooperative banking sector in rural Madras increased by a 
significant margin during the first half of the twentieth century. Between 1907 and 1929, the 
number of cooperative banks increased from 63 to 15,238.44 By 1952, there were 17,201 
primary banks where 16,616 banks operated with unlimited liability and 88 banks operated 
with limited liability.45 Membership, total working capital and the value of loans provided by 
primary banks more than doubled between 1928 and 1953. Total membership in primary banks 
increased from 652,285 in 1929 to 1,537,000 in 1953.46 The number of district banks remained 
stagnant at between 14 and 16 throughout the period, whereas the number of primary banks 
linked to each apex bank doubled between 1940 and 1955.47 There was also a rise in the average 
number of members per primary bank between 1928 and 1955.48 The Rural Credit Survey 
estimated that primary banks had an average membership of 88 in the 1950s.49 This was lower 
than similar estimations in nineteenth century Germany.50 The rise in the number of village 
 
43 Annual Report 1929, 10. 
44 B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, "The Co-operative Movement in the Madras Presidency." Indian Journal of 
Economics 14 (1934), 426. 
45 Rural Credit Survey, 220; Report of the Committee on Co-operation in Madras, (Madras, 1956), 425. 
46 Annual Report 1928-1939; Report of the Committee 1956. 
47 Report of the Committee 1956, 425. 
48 Annual Report 1928-39; Report of the Committee 1956.  
49 Rural Credit Survey Vol. II, (Bombay, 1954), 216. 
50 Guinnane “A Failed Institutional Transplant”, shows that the average membership size of Raiffeissen 
cooperatives in Germany fluctuated between 75 and 200. 
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banks was supplemented by a rise in membership, implying that there was an increase in the 
number of cultivators with access to cooperatives. 
The price of credit from cooperatives was an added success. Cooperatives charged lower 
interest rates than moneylenders. The government enforced a ceiling on the interest rates 
charged by primary banks. Rates fluctuated between 7.5 and 9.5 per cent per annum in the early 
1930s. As discussed, moneylenders in the same period charged rates of 2 per cent per month. 
Under these conditions, the data suggests that there was an expansion in the supply of low-cost 
credit during the early to mid-twentieth century.  
It is surprising then that cooperatives failed to capture a sizeable share of the credit market. 
A survey in 1935 estimated that credit from cooperatives accounted for just 6 per cent of all 
loans to cultivators.51 A similar report in 1956 provides a figure of just 3 per cent across India 
while confirming similar results for the market in Madras.52 B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, a 
provincial legislator in the Madras government, suggested that 7.9 per cent of rural households 
were members of credit cooperatives in the mid-1930s.53 Similarly, 23.5 per cent of the 
provincial rural population were, ‘within the fold of rural credit cooperatives’, with a small 
share of this group actually borrowing from cooperative banks in 1956, demonstrating that the 
lack of market penetration persisted throughout the period.54  
Cultivators did not benefit equally from the expansion of cooperative credit. Borrowers were 
concentrated in a small sub-section of the rural population. Primary banks selectively allocated 
loans to richer peasants. Government reports in the 1950s recognized this problem. According 
to the Rural Credit Survey, ‘small owners, tenants-at-will and labourers, the cultivators of areas 
with poor rainfall and the backward agricultural communities are hardly members of 
societies.’55 Data on loan sizes and collateral requirements on those loans signal the income 
profile of borrowers. Loans exceeding 250 rupees accounted for nearly half of all cooperative 
credit provided in 1930 and 1956.56 Loans from moneylenders were significantly smaller, 
suggesting that moneylenders rather than cooperatives were servicing the credit needs of the 
poor. Indeed, from a survey of moneylender-serviced credit markets in six villages in the 
Bellary district, the average debt per acre was 17 rupees in 1930.57 Assuming the size of loans 
 
51 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 40. 
52 Report of the Committee 1956, 41. 
53 Naidu, “The Co-operative Movement”, 420. 
54 Report of the Committee 1956, 40. 
55 Rural Credit Survey, 223. 
56 Provincial Banking Enquiry Report, 152; Report of the Committee 1956, 29. 
57 Provincial Banking Enquiry Report, 62-63. 
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increased proportionally to the size of land ownership, these numbers suggest that cooperatives 
showed a preference for high income borrowers.  
Furthermore, cooperatives shifted from non-asset-based to mortgage lending from the 
1920s. In the mid-1920s, mortgages accounted for 40 per cent of loans while borrowers 
accessed the majority of cooperative credit by attaching a co-signer to their loan applications. 
By 1938, 60 per cent of loans were secured by mortgage instruments. The government 
recognized that this was a departure from the original aims of the cooperative movement. 
Commenting on foreclosures in 1936, the Cooperative Department in Madras stated, ‘these 
properties are undoubtedly a source of embarrassment to societies and it must be their anxious 
concern to dispose of them in consultation with their financing banks at the earliest 
opportunity.’58 Cooperatives that acquired land from their members contradicted Nicholson’s 
principles of Raiffeisen banking. Collateral requirements excluded poor peasants from 
accessing cooperative credit.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The Great Depression explains the shift from co-signatory lending to mortgages.59 The co-
signatory method proved unsustainable during the 1930s crisis. Repayment rates were 
generally low in cooperatives. From loans issued in the late 1920s, primary banks declared 30 
per cent of expected interest inflows as overdue. As illustrated in Figure 2, recovery rates 
continued to decline as overdue interest increased by a further 30 per cent between 1930 and 
1934. Primary banks shifted to mortgage lending in the hope that auctioning the land acquired 
from defaulters would help mitigate losses. The colonial government enforced rules that 
ensured each cooperative limited the total value of loans to the net value of properties held in 
the cooperative’s possession.60 Cooperatives enforced this parameter to moderate the 
difference between the value of the properties securitised and the value of overdue loans. The 
rules entitled cooperatives to liquidate properties in times of default. The provincial 
government expected cooperatives to generate positive net balances by auctioning land they 
acquired from defaulters. 
 
58 Annual Report 1936, 12. 
59 Homogeneity in the occupation of borrower members spread the impact of the crisis. Cultivators constituted 
89.1 per cent of the total membership of primary banks (Annual Report 1929, 9). The commodity price crash in 
the early 1930s led to a rapid short-term decline in the membership of primary banks (Annual Report 1929-1934).  
60 Provincial Banking Enquiry Report, 151. 
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The recovery from the Depression started from 1937. Membership in primary banks 
increased by 2.6 per cent between 1937 and 1938, with a larger increase of 8.3 per cent in the 
following year. Primary banks expanded lending operations in the same period. The value of 
loans provided by primary banks in 1939 was 1 per cent shy of the same measure in 1929. This 
was supported by rising commodity prices in the early 1940s.61 However, cooperatives did not 
fully recover from the crisis. As demonstrated in Figure 2, primary banks reported net losses 
until 1950. The upward swing in commodity prices and the shift to mortgage lending had a 
limited impact on the profitability of cooperative banks. Why did cooperatives endure losses 
despite the move to more selective lending? 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
One potential answer is that cooperatives were constrained by enforcement costs. 
Institutional barriers prevented banks from acquiring land in a timely and cost-efficient manner. 
Land transfer required the ratification of legal authority while court disputes were lengthy and 
expensive.62 The colonial government created a legal structure, for cooperative banks, that 
functioned outside the scope of civil courts. The 1932 Madras Co-operative Societies Act 
specified that cooperative disputes were to be resolved by representatives of the Registrar, as 
chair, of the cooperative department in the provincial government.63 The government created 
special arbitration courts within districts to enforce land transfers following defaults.64 These 
forums failed to solve the problem. The rising number of pending disputes in the early 1930s 
triggered concerns among policymakers that arbitration courts were also a costly and inefficient 
method of enforcing repayments.65 
However, enforcement barriers do not fully explain losses in the cooperative sector. 
According to Nicholson’s prototype, self-help should have substituted external enforcement in 
the first instance. The requirement for courts in itself represents a failure in cooperation among 
members. The next section of the paper shows that cooperatives shifted to mortgage lending 
and incurred persistent losses because of flaws in capital structure and regulatory design.  
 
61 Michelle McAlpin, “Price Movements and Fluctuations in Economic Activity (1860–1947),” in The Cambridge 
Economic History of India, edited by Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, (Cambridge, 1983), Appendix Table 
11A.1. 
62 Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy. 
63 Section 51 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act (VI of 1932). 
64 Arbitration forums were the preferred forums of appeal for banks and defaulters alike. The number of 
cooperative disputes in arbitration forums exceeded appeals in Civil Courts by a significant margin. 
65 Annual Report 1937,10. 
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4 Low Savings and Weak Regulation 
 
Primary banks were not self-funded and borrowed from district banks to fund their lending 
operations in Madras. High savings in district banks and low savings in primary banks 
entrenched a banking structure of debt dependence. As a result, primary banks were poorly 
regulated. Low savings restricted the capacity for mutual supervision in primary banks. Top-
down regulation did not substitute for the absence of this bottom-up supervision. As mentioned 
before, the entire banking system in India did not have a formal regulator until the 1949 
Banking Regulation Act, and even that act did not cover cooperatives.66 The outcome of the 
flawed design, this section demonstrates, was weak regulation and mismanagement.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4, primary banks in Madras raised most of their working capital 
through external borrowing.67  Loans from district banks financed between 70 and 80 per cent 
of the required working capital in primary banks.  Members’ and non-members’ deposits 
accounted for between 5 and 11 per cent of total working capital. Share capital played a 
marginally more important role than savings in primary banks. However, share capital included 
investments from members and district banks. The majority of this investment was from district 
banks in the 1930s, accentuating the external funding problem.68  
Why were savings low in primary banks? Colonial officials maintained that peasants were 
ill-informed about the benefits of saving such that disposable income was rarely saved and 
instead spent on extravagant ceremonies.69 In practice, rural cultivators faced two barriers to 
saving. First, savings rates were low because harvest failure was common and cultivation was 
unprofitable in bad years. An indirect confirmation of the claim that volatile seasonal incomes 
 
66 The Indian government modified the 1949 Banking Regulation Act to include cooperatives in 1965. For laws 
and private banking in the colonial period, see Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy. For a discussion on the 
Banking Regulation Act, see Autar K. Koul and Mihir Chatterjee, "International Financial Institutions and 
Indian Banking: a Legal Profile" in India and International Law, edited by Bimal N. Patel, (Leiden, 2008). 
67 The ratio of external borrowings to working capital declined from 74 to 60 per cent between 1928 and 1935, 
coinciding with a rise in the ratio of reserves to working capital from 6 to 16 per cent in the same period. Banks 
were either liquidated or more risk-averse during the Depression. The temporary decline in the ratio of external 
borrowings in the 1930s does not infer greater self-sufficiency. 
68 Annual Report 1936, 30-31. 
69 See Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (Bombay, 1947). 
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depressed rural savings is that the ratio of saving to working capital was higher in urban 
cooperatives during the same period.70  
Second, rich peasants did not save in primary banks. Two factors explain this outcome. First, 
cultivators invested disposable income in the credit market as moneylenders.71 According to 
Panikar, ‘90 per cent of rural credit (in the 1950s) seems to come from the saving of rural 
families.’72 Moneylending presented a more lucrative option to saving. As mentioned, there 
was a gap between the interest rates charged on loans from moneylenders and those offered by 
cooperative banks. Second, rich peasants saved in district rather than primary banks. There was 
a marked increase in the number of individual depositors in district banks in the late 1920s.73 
The ratio of savings to loans in district banks was significantly higher than the same ratio in 
primary banks. At the peak of the Depression in 1933-34, savings deposits accounted for 62 
per cent of the total working capital of district banks. A combination of share capital and 
savings contributed 72 per cent of total working capital in the same year.74  
Rich peasants chose to save in district banks because, based on the government’s design, 
the deposits of members and non-members in district banks had a stronger guarantee than 
deposits in primary banks. Individual depositors were not the only savers in district banks. 
Local government departments saved as did groups of primary banks. The colonial government 
framed laws to ensure that primary banks maintained a reserve ratio, physically deposited in 
district banks. According to the laws, primary banks deposited this ‘statutory contribution’ in 
the district bank that they were indebted to.75 This required reserve increased the value of 
deposits in district banks. When primary banks defaulted on loans to district banks, the reserve 
fund diminished before savings. Moreover, groups of primary banks borrowed from and 
deposited reserves in one district bank. District banks offset the defaults from one primary bank 
with the reserves of another.76 District banks also restricted the volume of lending to failing 
primary banks. Indeed, district banks maintained higher reserves and reduced lending to 
primary banks in the 1930s.77 Deposits from primary banks and risk-averse lending in crisis 
years, both enforced by government regulation, protected member and non-member deposits 
in district banks. 
 
70 Annual Report 1928-1939. 
71 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 43. 
72 P. G. K. Panikar, Rural Savings in India, (Bombay, 1970), 59. 
73 Annual Report 1936, 19. 
74 Annual Report 1934, 24. 
75 Annual Report 1930, 16-17. 
76 Annual Report 1936, 19. 
77 The volume of district bank to primary bank loans halved between 1929 and 1935 (Annual Report 1929-1935). 
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The Depression had a larger impact on primary than on district banks. Between 1929 and 
1939, district banks reported a decline in net profits from 1.1 million rupees to just over 300,000 
rupees. In the same decade, primary banks transitioned from earning a net profit of 60,000 
rupees to reporting net losses of 1.62 million rupees.78 Reserves and higher savings in district 
banks moderated the transmission of primary bank losses up the cooperative ladder. The 
combination of share capital, savings and reserve deposits constituted 77 per cent of the total 
working capital of district banks in 1933-34.79 Deposits insured defaults, restricting losses 
incurred. In contrast, primary banks were funded by external borrowing. Defaults were high 
and deposits were small, leading to persistent losses. 
Low savings posed a problem for supervision in primary banks. Members of cooperative 
panchayats, including presidents and secretaries, were commonly neither savers nor 
shareholders. The incentive for self-contained supervision diminished as the burden of default 
was not borne by the deposits or share-capital of governing members. According to Eleanor 
Hough’s thesis on the management of Indian cooperatives in the early 1930s, ‘the cooperative 
safeguards of mutual watchfulness and supervision are absent and everything depends on the 
committee’s honesty and business ability’.80 This problem persisted throughout the period. On 
the management of primary banks, the Rural Credit Survey in 1954 reported that, ‘there is a 
paucity of members who are actually cultivating lands themselves. The agricultural finance by 
the co-operatives would be more efficient and smooth if ways and means are devised to secure 
invariably the presence of some actual cultivators on the board of management.’81 The 
employment of professional managers rather than shareholders resulted in a lack of monetary 
incentives to increase the profitability of primary banks. The provincial government reported 
the following in 1929, 
 
Though the objects of co-operative banks and commercial banks may be different, the 
one seeking to increase the shareholders’ profit being ruled by shareholders who have 
generally no other interest in the concern, while the other seeks to benefit the borrower 
shareholder, whose interest as borrower is far greater than his interest as shareholder.82 
 
 
78 Annual Report 1928-1939. 
79 Annual Report 1934, 50-51. 
80 Eleanor M. Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India: Its Relation to a Sound National Economy, (London, 
1932), 60. While affiliated to George Washington University in the early 1930s, Eleanor Hough wrote a doctoral 
thesis on the cooperative movement in India. 
81 Rural Credit Survey, 263. 
82 Annual Report 1929, 17. 
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In other words, the governance structure in primary banks did not foster sound management 
through self-regulation.83  
Supervising Unions did not solve the problem either. By 1931, there were 431 Supervising 
Unions in rural Madras alone.84 However, the government did not design Unions to hire 
external supervisors. Officials were concerned that external supervision would lead to the 
cooperative movement departing from its aims of being self-contained within villages. In his 
capacity as Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies in the Madras government, K. 
Deivasikhamani Mudaliar stated in 1937, ‘for the efficient administration of village societies 
local knowledge and help is essential. The money lent to the villagers can be recovered easily 
only with their help. Nothing can be done in a village without the help of the villagers.’85 
Accordingly, the government implemented policies to ensure that supervision remained within 
the scope of the managers of primary banks. Members of Supervising Unions constituted 
representatives from the panchayats of primary banks. As a result, the governance structure of 
Supervising Unions extended, rather than corrected, the lack of management accountability in 
primary banks. Supervising unions, as recorded in an official report in 1935, ‘cannot be 
independent and disinterested bodies, as they are run mostly by representatives of the very 
societies, which have to be supervised. Is it any wonder then that the supervisor is often forced, 
if he is to keep his job, to collude with the managements of credit societies in all their 
misdemeanours?’86  
The reference to misdemeanour is significant. The government supplemented supervision 
with annual audits of primary banks. Audits were initially voluntary and paid for by the banks 
themselves.87 This changed with the rising number of defaults in the late 1920s. From the early 
1930s, annual government audits were compulsory for all primary banks. Regular audits 
exposed the frequency of fraudulent lending practiced by the managers of primary banks. The 
frequency of management fraud became more apparent during the Depression. According to 
 
83 One potential barrier to self-regulation was illiteracy. Members needed a basic understanding of loan accounting 
and contracts to effectively supervise banks. However, certain institutional arrangements solved the problem in 
Madras. The Provincial Banking Enquiry reported in 1930 that cultivators approached local school teachers and 
clerks competent in simple accounting methods to assist in analysing loan documentation. Moreover, the 
provincial government established cooperative training institutes in districts. The institutes provided free 
assistance to illiterate members. 
84 Naidu “The Co-operative Movement”, 427. 
85 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 510. 
86 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 60. 
87 Section 17 of the 1912 Co-operative Societies Act allowed for panchayats to audit primary banks. 
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one official report in 1931, ‘in the prevailing tightness of the money market defaulting 
secretaries were no longer able to restore the stolen funds on the approach of an inspection.’88  
Auditors provided certificates to all banks at the end of every audit. Certificates contained 
a grade, running from ‘A’ to ‘D’. Government auditors branded Class A banks ‘thoroughly 
good societies’ while class D banks were ‘bad societies which probably have to be liquidated.’ 
In the financial year 1932-1933, the government audited 13,425 banks, of which 1735 banks 
were in the ‘D’ group.89 Auditors carried out additional scrutiny on banks with the largest 
defaults to identify areas of mismanagement or, in severe cases, fraud. In the same year, 77 
cases of fraud were pending criminal prosecution. Arbitration forums charged 87 individuals 
in total, of which 77 were in management positions in primary banks.90 There were consistent 
numbers of criminal prosecutions for the misappropriation of funds throughout the 1930s. As 
recorded in 1936, ‘There are no signs of diminution in cases of defalcation; the department 
does its best to purge the movement of dishonest members but obviously can do little unless 
honest men come forward to run the societies.’91  
On discovery of misconduct, employees from district banks or the provincial government 
superseded the management board of the mismanaged primary bank. In 1935, audit reports 
from the Krishna district exposed mismanagement in a regional cluster of primary banks. 
Employees from its financing district bank, the Krishna District Co-operative Bank, 
subsequently took control of the management of these banks.92 Following the supersession, the 
provincial government liquidated banks that failed to achieve a grade above ‘D’.  
Managers practiced two types of misconduct, one more serious than the other. The first, and 
less serious of the two, was insider lending. Evidence shows managers provided loans to 
members of the same caste. The social composition of management boards in the cooperative 
sector in the North Arcot district in the early 1920s provides evidence of this form of 
discriminatory lending. There were 30,000 members of primary banks in the district, 2700 or 
9 per cent of which were Brahman. According to one report, 6 out of 7 directors of the district 
bank and 12 out of 14 supervisors of primary banks were from the Brahman caste. The 
managers of primary banks in the district allocated the majority of loans to Brahman members, 
while default rates saw a steady increase in the 1920s. By the early 1930s, the government 
 
88 Annual Report 1931, 17. 
89 Annual Report 1933, 8. 
90 Annual Report 1933, 14. 
91 Annual Report 1936, 17. 
92 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1935, 324. 
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liquidated 11 out of 30 Supervising Unions in the district for ‘inefficient supervision and 
mismanagement of affairs.’93 
The second type of management malpractice was embezzlement. Bank managers siphoned 
money for personal benefit. Legal records from the 1930s provide evidence of managers who 
issued loans either to themselves or to a network of their relatives. In the 1933 dispute Re: Patri 
Venkata Hanumantha vs Unknown, for example, the Secretary of a cooperative in the Guntur 
district was found to have issued large sums to either himself, his brother or his cousin in 
regular intervals in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Managers forged contracts, declaring fake 
names and mortgage securities. Borrowers did not repay loans and managers declared these 
loans as unrecovered principal in the bank’s account books. The prosecution argued that ‘while 
the depletion in the resources of the bank was taking place on account of the series of 
misappropriations slyly committed by the 1st accused, the financial equilibrium of the bank 
became patently unstable and on account of the large overdues there was pressure from several 
quarters.’94 Recipients of loans, including the Secretary of the bank, were indicted with prison 
sentences of 10 years while those convicted of abetting the crime were charged with 7-year 
imprisonments.  
Bank managers embezzled to lend at high interest rates in the informal credit market. 
Members of the managing committee were either ‘trader, moneylender or shopkeeper’ in 7 out 
of 19 surveyed primary banks in the Coimbatore district in 1957.95 Similarly, members of the 
management board were moneylenders in 8 out of 19 surveyed banks in the West Godavari 
district. The Rural Credit Survey reported that the vested interests of administrators cum 
moneylenders ‘worked against the interests of the society’ they were managing.96 From the 
recorded banks in Table 3, the report on bank W3 in the West Godavari district stated that the 
‘President was very powerful and used to take benami loans – traders and landlords were on 
the managing committee.’97 The bank reported a 100 per cent ratio of overdue repayment to 
 
93 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 88. 
94 Re: Patri Venkata Hanumantha vs Unknown, (1934 66 MLJ 193, Madras, 6 October 1933). Case records report 
similar methods of misappropriation throughout the period. In the case, Most Revd. Dr. L. Mathias, S.C., the 
Archbishop of Madras and the President of the Catholic Indian Association and anr. Vs. Kilacheri Agricultural 
Co-operative Bank (1938 1 MLJ 241, Madras, 5 October 1937), the secretary of the Kilacheri Agricultural Co-
operative Bank accepted deposits on behalf of the bank. The secretary subsequently embezzled these funds. 
95 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 446. 
96 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 446. 
97 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 731. Benami literally translates to ‘without name’. In this context, it refers to 
the practice of managers lending to accounts attached to fictitious holders. The accounts belonged to either the 
managers themselves or their relatives. 
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outstanding loans. The government disbarred the bank from lending in 1954. Similarly, the 
Rural Credit Survey also reported the following on a primary bank in the Coimbatore district,  
 
Society C5, organised in 1919, was dominated by landowners. The ex-president 
misappropriated funds by making unreceipted collections. Since then, the members lost 
confidence in the society which gradually stopped functioning. Improper management, 
lack of proper supervision and timely help from the central bank and Co-operation 
Department resulted in misappropriation and consequent deterioration in the financial 
position of the society.98 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Audits failed to restrict embezzlement for two reasons. First, siphoned money left 
undetected as managers falsified accounts. Audits of primary banks commonly yielded 
inaccurate reports.99 As one official report in 1956 suggested, ‘as a result of its inability to 
employ paid staff, account-keeping leaves much to be desired and naturally demands more of 
the time of the supervisory and audit staff.’100 This feature of primary banks persisted 
throughout the period. Approximately 92 per cent of audited banks in 1934 were reported to 
have defects in their account books.101 Similarly, as shown in Table 3, 10 out of 19 surveyed 
primary banks in the Coimbatore district in 1957 were reported to have errors in accounting. 
Managers recorded defaults as extensions rather than overdue repayments in the balance sheet 
of primary banks. This lack of accounting transparency was a barrier to efficient regulation.  
Second, the provincial government did not supplement audits with effective enforcement. 
Scholarship on cooperatives in Germany demonstrates that the publication of management 
dishonesty to various stakeholders ensured that managers did not resort to fraud.102 Some 
government officials in 1930s Madras also recognized the importance of this form of social 
enforcement. One report in 1935 suggested that, ‘the maximum of publicity is required. This 
was Raiffeisen’s (in the German context) great maxim.’ The report proceeded to comment that, 
‘Audit reports are not even opened and read for years together, meetings are not held to 
consider such reports and members are not kept informed of their financial position.’103 
Managers were apparently unafraid of failed audits. According to one report, ‘if panchayats 
 
98 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 363. 
99 Claude F. Strickland, "Coöperation and the Rural Problem of India", Quarterly Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 
(1929): 515-517. 
100 Provincial Banking Enquiry Report, 151 
101 Annual Report 1934, 16. Auditors reported that 12,550 out of 13,552 banks had defects in their account books. 
102 Guinnane, “A Friend and Advisor”. 
103 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 63. 
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who know their duties and responsibilities deliberately abuse their position, it cannot be 
effectively prevented. You may close the society for this reason but the mischief is already 
done. Therefore, supervision alone may not bring about the reform necessary in societies.’104  
The paper has so far shown that primary banks reported persistent losses due to low savings 
and weak regulation. However, the expansion of the cooperative sector in the 1940s and 1950s 
presents a paradox. A new level of state intervention explains this puzzle.  
 
5 State Intervention: Prolonging Banking Failure 
 
The provincial government did not lend to cooperatives and restricted its participation to 
conducting annual audits in the colonial period. District and municipal government 
departments saved unspent revenue in district banks. However, the value of government 
deposits was lower than the savings of members and non-members in the district banks.105 The 
post-colonial government adopted a more interventionist stance in the late 1940s. While state 
officials did identify a problem in the failure of cooperative banks to be both equitable and 
profitable, the newly formed government believed that capital injections into the cooperative 
sector was the solution.  
The risk of participation in a fragile banking sector motivated the colonial government’s 
passive stance. Loans from government accounted for a negligible share of the working capital 
of primary banks in the 1930s. The ratio of government loans to the total working capital of 
primary banks fluctuated between 0.7 and 1.7 per cent between 1928 and 1939.106 Government 
loans were not provided to either district banks or the provincial bank in the same period. The 
Indian central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), in particular, played a limited role in the 
cooperative movement during the colonial period. Deposits from commercial banks formed the 
majority of the reserves held by the RBI. Rather than lend the savings of large commercial 
banks to risky rural cooperatives, the RBI adopted a non-interventionist approach to the 
cooperative movement. Justifying this non-interventionist stance in the Bombay Co-operative 
Quarterly in 1938, the RBI stated that, 
 
The sum and substance of the lengthy memorandum is that while the Reserve Bank is 
willing to offer advice and even to direct and control co-operative finance it is not willing 
at present, for various reasons, to deal with provincial co-operative banks – in the case 
 
104Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 511. 
105 Report of the Committee 1928, 18-22. 
106 Annual Report 1928-1939. 
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of some because they are not creditworthy, in the case of others because they have 
established their credit and possess resources themselves.107 
 
The end of colonial rule marked a turning point in the role of the RBI in the cooperative 
movement. The government’s First (1951) and Second (1956) Five Year Plans focused on 
increasing intervention in rural credit through greater participation in cooperatives. The 
government attributed the limited success of cooperatives to displace informal sources of credit 
before 1947 to liquidity constraints in primary banks. Accordingly, the First Five Year Plan 
proposed large capital injections into the cooperative machinery to drive out moneylenders 
from rural credit markets. This increase in state participation did not translate to a direct 
interaction with primary banks.  
The RBI extended large volumes of credit to district banks from the late 1940s. The first 
disbursement of loans to district banks was in 1947. Between 1947 and 1951, the value of state 
financing to district banks increased by over five times.108 The capital injection into district 
banks did translate into an increase in the loans provided by primary banks. Indeed, there was 
a significant rise in membership and working capital in primary banks from the late 1940s.109 
Government officials perceived the growth in membership and lending as a success. It was 
a sign that cooperatives were able to capture a greater share of the credit market from village 
moneylenders. Accordingly, government reports in the early 1950s sustained the position that 
undercapitalisation was a primary driver of cooperatives’ failure in the pre-1947 period.110  The 
desire for increased capitalisation led to a further enhancement in state financing to district 
banks in the late 1950s. The government established various initiatives, involving the allocation 
of public funds to rural cooperatives to achieve two aims. First, as mentioned, to enhance the 
capitalisation of rural cooperatives in general.111 State governments significantly increased 
their subscription of share capital in district banks during this period. Second, the government 
allotted public funds to some cooperatives in crisis years, particularly the banks incurring losses 
because borrowers were impacted by environmental shocks and crop failure.112 
However, the level of savings in primary banks did not increase at the same rate as the level 
of state financing. The rate of growth in central bank loans exceeded the growth rate in savings 
 
107 History of the Reserve Bank of India, (Bombay, 1970), 207. 
108 History of the Reserve Bank of India, 782. 
109 Report of the Committee 1956, 425-428. 
110 Report of the Committee 1956, 8-10. 
111 The National Agricultural Credit Fund, managed by the RBI, provided loans to state governments. The 
governments used the loans to invest in district bank shares.  
112 The National and State Cooperative Development Funds, also managed by the RBI, extended credit to 
cooperatives that reported high default rates because of harvest failures. 
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during the late 1940s. Between 1947 and 1952, the ratio of savings to working capital in 
primary banks declined from 7 per cent to 4 per cent.113  In other words, the transition in 1947 
did not change the legacy of low savings. The ratio between savings and external borrowings 
widened as primary banks were less self-funded than they were before receiving financial 
assistance from the RBI. According to data from the 1940s and 1950s, loans from district banks 
continued to finance the loans provided by primary banks. Data on the primary banks shows 
that the ratio of external borrowings accrued to loans issued varied between 90 and 130 per 
cent between 1947 and 1955.114  
In short, problems in the cooperative sector in the colonial period were carried forward in 
the post-colonial period. Governments intervened in cooperatives through financial 
contributions with limited impact on capital structure and regulation. Low savings perpetuated 
the lack of bottom-up supervision. Managers of primary banks continued to be held 
accountable by ineffective top-down regulation. To make matters worse, public revenue was 
being allocated to a failing banking sector in the post-colonial period. This added moral hazard 




Policymakers in colonial India identified market failure in rural credit as the driver of 
persistent rural impoverishment. They believed that cooperative banking would solve the 
problem by both expanding the supply of credit and restricting the monopoly power of the 
moneylender. Tested success of Raiffeisen banks in Europe inspired the government to create 
a structure of self-help banking in India from the early twentieth century. This intervention, 
however, failed to deliver the desired outcome. Cooperative banks rationed credit for many 
poor borrowers; despite expansion in size, cooperatives captured a small share of the business; 
and they were unprofitable throughout. The paper investigates the reasons behind the 
persistence of these problems by showing where the Indian model departed from the stylized 
Raiffeisen one in the province where the experiment began.   
One part of the explanation consists of showing how low savings reduced the role for self-
supervision. The government created a three-tier banking structure including primary banks, 
district banks and a provincial cooperative bank. In the primary banks, depositor and 
 
113 See Figure 4. 
114 Report of the Committee 1956, 425-430. 
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shareholder members were few while borrower members were many. Richer peasants crowded 
the top-end of the cooperative hierarchy as depositors while poorer peasants crowded the 
bottom-end as borrowers. Deposits in district banks had a stronger government guarantee than 
deposits in primary banks. This design flaw allowed the rich to refuse to cooperate with the 
poor. There was limited mutual supervision as managers were not held accountable by 
members. 
External regulation could potentially solve the problem. The government established 
Supervising Unions and a top-down regulatory structure including annual audits and a defined 
process for the liquidation of insolvent banks. However, embezzlement and insider lending 
persisted as the interests of the supervisors, auditors and managers conflicted. Although 
available sources omit the details of the problem, these suggest that regulatory flaws lay in its 
design. The laws governing regulation were designed not by the banking regulator but by the 
provincial government. Enforcement was compromised, especially where bank managers 
carried social and political influence. 
Though dysfunctional, the cooperative structure survived. The state allocated public revenue 
to cooperative banks. Local government departments deposited unspent revenue in district 
banks during the 1920s and 1930s. The state expanded its financial participation in the 
cooperative sector in the 1940s. Large capital injections were made into primary banks from 
1946. State intervention altered the capital structure of the cooperative sector. Whereas primary 
banks were debt dependent to apex banks in the 1930s and 1940s, the 1950s introduced the 
government as the source of lending in the rural credit market. Financial contributions from 
the state entrenched the problem of moral hazard into cooperative banking in post-colonial 
India. The problems of dependence on external funds, regulatory failure, and losses, therefore, 
persisted. 
The study offers larger lessons on the challenges of top-down cooperative banking 
promotion in poor agrarian societies. One lesson is that economic inequality and unequal socio-
political influence among rich and poor peasants prevented cooperation in Indian villages. The 
paper goes further. It analyses institutional and policy regimes to suggest that thanks to a lack 
of management accountability, a small section of the rural population benefited from loss-
making cooperative banks. Cooperative transplants required a regulatory structure that 
supported efficient banking. Additional capital injections into a fragile transplant extended 
rather than solved structural failures. For the governments in colonial and post-colonial India, 
providing easy access to credit was the central objective. The cooperative organization was a 
casualty of this policy. 
25 
 
Further research could expand on the impact of banking regulation by the executive, rather 
than independent regulators, on the performance of cooperatives. In group lending 
arrangements, the expectation is that local and insider supervision would ensure efficient 
management. This case study of Madras suggests that internal supervision was not a sufficient 
condition, especially when savings rates were low. External regulation was needed. 
Cooperative banks in India continued to report losses after 1960, suggesting that the lessons 

































Principles of a Raiffeisen Cooperative 
Feature Outcome 
Self-funded  Rich and poor save in banks. Defaults diminish savings. 
Self-
supervised  
In fear of losing savings to bad loans, members identify creditworthy 
borrowers and enforce the repayment of loans through social sanctions. 
Externally 
Regulated 
Regulators hold managers accountable. 
Sources: Abhijit V. Banerjee, Timothy Besley, and Timothy W. Guinnane, “Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design 
of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no. 2 (1994): 491–515; 
Maitreesh Ghatak and Timothy W. Guinnane, “The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and 





















Structure of Cooperative Banking in Madras 
 
Organization c. 1930 Role 
Government Enforced laws and regulated cooperative banks. 
Provincial Bank  
Savings bank in the city. Provided a small amount of credit to 
district and primary banks. 
District Bank 
A savings bank for members, non-members, primary banks 
and local government. Provided credit to primary banks. 
Primary Bank 
A savings bank for members and non-members. Lending 
bank for members in rural villages.  






























Coimbatore 19 9 10 8 
West 
Godavari 
19 17 2 3 
Source: Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 687-696.  
The ‘Legible’ result in this survey measures the number of banks with account books without any errors. The 
‘Erroneous’ result measures the number of banks that had errors in their account books. ‘Failed Audit’ measures 
the number of banks with audit certificates of ‘C’ grade and below. Savings were either negligible or non-existent 

















































Figure 1. Security on loans, 1928-1939. Figure shows the value of loans attached to three credit instruments. 
Mortgage refers to loans secured by land. Co-signatory refers to loans contractually secured by third-party 
guarantors. Movables refers to loans secured by crop. The source provides the total volume of lending by primary 
banks in a given year, disaggregated to the volume of loans under the three types of credit instrument in a given 
year. Ratios calculated and converted to percentage in the source. 






















































Figure 2. Profitability of primary banks, 1929-1955. Figure shows that primary banks made losses throughout the 
period. The government collected data from each primary bank and aggregated this to the provincial level in the 
source. Profit and loss calculations made by the author. ‘Net Profit’ takes the difference between divisible profit 
and non-recouped loss in a given year. Net Profit plotted on the left y-axis. The dotted line indicates when primary 
banks break-even. ‘Overdue Interest’ is calculated in the source and plotted on the right y-axis. It measures default 
rates in a given year by estimating the ratio of unpaid interest to total interest obligations. For example, in 1934 
the ratio of overdue interest to interest due was 0.64, which means that primary banks only recovered 36 per cent 
of their expected interest inflows that year.  


































































































































Figure 4. Ratio of savings and share capital to working capital,1928-1955. Figure shows savings and share capital 
constituted a small share of the working capital in primary banks. The sources provide data on the total working 
capital of primary banks with the value of savings, investment and debt. For ease of comparison, the author rounds 
all numbers to the nearest ten-thousand. The reports exclude data from the Ganjam district in 1936-37. Data scope 
shifts from ‘composite’ to ‘residuary’ state in 1953 to reflect the changing of state borders after independence. 
These two factors do not bias the results in any way.  
Sources: Annual Report 1928-1939; Report of the Committee 1956. 
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